As rivalry over critical minerals intensifies and China tightens its grip on global supply chains, the United States is recasting economic vulnerability as a core national security threat. Washington’s latest National Security and Defense Strategy, paired with new executive actions targeting critical minerals and strategic geographies such as Venezuela, Iran and Greenland, signals a deliberate shift: securing the materials that power modern industry is now inseparable from preserving American geopolitical supremacy. Together, these moves reveal a two-pronged geographic strategy that focuses on dominating the Americas and competing in the Eastern Hemisphere, reshaping US foreign policy and projecting traditional power dynamics onto resource-rich regions central to great power competition.

The era of American primacy is giving way to a more complex world. The global order has shifted from unipolarity to a multipolar world, where rising middle powers and shifting alliances constantly redraw the map of influence. Faced with this new reality, the United States is recalibrating its strategy, focusing on the instruments of power that Joseph S. Nye Jr. defines: coercion, payment, and attraction. Power, in the twenty-first century, is as much about connectivity and access as it is about diplomatic and military might.

Trade War

The US-China trade war began in January 2018 as a series of measures aimed at reducing a massive trade deficit, but it quickly escalated into a foundational struggle for global economic and technological supremacy. Following a Section 301 investigation into China’s intellectual property practices, the United States imposed widespread tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of goods, prompting immediate retaliatory duties from Beijing on American agricultural and automotive exports. Over the following years, the conflict expanded beyond simple customs duties, characterized by aggressive export controls on advanced semiconductors, a 100% tariff on electric vehicles, and a high-stakes standoff over critical minerals. By 2026, the dispute has shifted from a tariff battle into a permanent realignment of global supply chains, where trade is increasingly dictated by national security interests and the control of chokepoint technologies rather than purely market-driven competition.

Where the Minerals are

Critical minerals are distributed across all continents, but the majority of global supply comes from a small number of regions, notably Australia, Africa, and South America. These regions play an important role in supporting global supply chains. Australia stands out as one of the world’s top five producers of bauxite, cobalt, gold, lead, manganese, rare earths, rutile, tantalum, uranium, and zinc. It is also the world’s leading lithium producer, accounting for nearly half of global supply.

Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar are major producers of copper, nickel, cobalt, and heavy rare earth elements (HREEs). The Democratic Republic of the Congo holds vast copper deposits and supplies approximately 75 percent of the world’s cobalt. South Africa is a key source of manganese and platinum group metals and accounts for roughly 70 percent of global chromite production. In the Americas, the so-called “Lithium Triangle” holds the world’s largest lithium reserves. Chile and Peru possess the largest copper deposits and together supply about half of global copper production, with Mexico also contributing significantly. Brazil has substantial deposits of heavy rare earth elements. Canada leads global potash production, ranks among the top five producers of key minerals such as indium, niobium, platinum group metals, titanium concentrate, and uranium.

The Chinese Strategy to Mineral Security

China faces its own set of supply chain challenges, primarily because it relies on foreign imports for the majority of its raw minerals. As the world’s preeminent manufacturing hub, it requires a steady and massive flow of critical minerals to fuel its industrial sectors. China has spent decades building a state-backed grip on critical minerals, moving from rare earths in the 1950s to today’s mining, refining, and logistics chokepoints. By leveraging Western technology, and pushing subsidized state enterprises abroad through a consolidated strategy, Beijing secured global assets—especially in Africa, Australia and South America—while embedding influence in infrastructure and finance. This tight integration delivers pricing power and supply security. China’s influence over critical minerals goes well beyond mining. The true source of control is processing, where Beijing dominates the bottleneck. That control allows it to set global prices, restrict supply, and weaponize exports. China has employed punitive trade sanctions against US, Japan, and the European Union, restricting the supply of minerals.

The US Game Plan

Washington sees reliance on foreign critical minerals as a strategic vulnerability. With 12 minerals 100% imported and another 29 over 50% import reliant. The US is looking to establish a full critical minerals value chain, including exploration, mining, processing, refining, recycling, logistics and investment. The US will prioritize developing domestic endowments, including Alaska and offshore resources. Through Project Vault it will create a stockpile of critical minerals. The US is pursuing a two-track international engagement strategy: deepening bilateral partnerships while also leveraging multilateral forums such as the Mineral Security Partnership, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, C5+1 Mineral Dialogue, Pax Silica, and the G-7 to institutionalize supply-chain security.

Weaponizing Resilience with Statecraft

​The operational pivot of this doctrine was codified on January 14, 2026, when the White House issued a landmark proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. By officially designating the import of processed critical minerals and their derivatives as a threat to national security, Washington has moved beyond mere diplomacy into aggressive economic statecraft. Rather than imposing immediate blanket tariffs, the 232 action establishes a 180-day negotiation window, effectively issuing an ultimatum to trading partners: align with US supply chain standards or face exclusion from the American market.

​Central to this strategy is the pursuit of international price floors for clean minerals—those processed outside of adversarial control. By redefining “hemispheric defense” as the exclusion of extra-hemispheric rivals from these supply chains, Washington is establishing a resource-based security perimeter that stretches from the lithium-rich Andean altiplano to the newly accessible rare-earth deposits of the Arctic. This mechanism is designed to insulate Western mining projects from the predatory price dumping long practiced by Beijing, creating a protected economic zone where resilience is prioritized over market efficiency. Through Section 232, the US is not just securing minerals; it is architecting a bifurcated global market where national security dictates the flow of resources.

Securing the Americas: Primary Supply Chain

“In the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”- Theodore Roosevelt

In the twenty-first century, the Western Hemisphere — from Greenland and Canada to the Latin America and the strategic Lobito Corridor in Africa — has become the centerpiece of a resurgent US geostrategic agenda. Washington is not merely securing supply lines for hydrocarbons and critical raw materials; it is aggressively aiming for hemispheric dominance, repackaging old doctrines for a new era of great-power competition.

What historians once called the Monroe Doctrine — a 19th-century claim that Europe should stay out of the Americas — has returned with a vengeance. Under the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” the United States is signaling that no rival power, especially China or Russia, will be permitted a foothold in what American policymakers now openly treat as their backyard. This is not defensive posturing: it is a strategic bid for control of energy flows, mineral wealth, and supply chains critical to global technological and military competition.

The modern “Donroe” logic echoes Theodore Roosevelt’s early-20th-century corollary — which justified US interventions to enforce order in the hemisphere — but now with a 21st-century twist: US power will be used not just to exclude rivals but to integrate vast swaths of the Western Hemisphere into American-dominated economic and security networks. Latin America’s oil reserves and critical minerals, Greenland’s rare earth wealth, and strategic corridors connecting the Americas to Africa — including the Lobito Corridor, which would channel copper and cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia — are now chess pieces in a high-stakes contest with Beijing and Moscow.

What was once framed as hemispheric security has become an explicitly offensive geopolitical strategy — one that risks igniting backlash from regional actors and reshaping the balance of power in the global south. If unchecked, this revival of Monroe’s legacy may bind US interests ever tighter to a strategy of unilateral dominance rather than collaborative engagement.

But the United States faces a serious challenge: China has made deep inroads into South America through massive investments in infrastructure, energy, and development, and it has become a major market for the region. In this context, the growing Canada–China and Brazil–China ties are not just economic partnerships—they are strategic examples of how regional actors are hedging against US dominance.

Although, recent events show the shift from doctrine to action. In the Monduro incident, the US exercised force to block rival access to Venezuelan resources, signaling a willingness to coerce competitors. The US naval blockade against Cuba’s oil imports, is another maneuver seeking to force the government into political and diplomatic alignment. Washington has also tightened control over Panama’s ports and pushed the country away from China’s Belt and Road Initiative — a clear sign that US pressure is reshaping the hemisphere’s strategic landscape.

However, this Donroe resurgence is triggering a profound realignment in the Global South. Rather than falling into line, regional heavyweights like Canada and Brazil are leveraging the 180-day Section 232 negotiation window to strengthen ties with the East. In early 2026, the Lula administration responded to US trade pressure by hosting a landmark BRICS+ summit in Rio, positioning Brazil as a neutral refuge for low-carbon technology and mineral processing.

Meanwhile, Beijing has moved from diplomatic criticism to strategic opportunism. Following the US military operation in Venezuela on January 3, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi framed China as the lawful alternative to American hegemony. Beijing’s strategy is clear: while the US utilizes the big stick of military and tariff coercion, China continues to offer the railways and ports that South American nations require for development, effectively daring Washington to provide a competitive economic alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative

Competing in the Eastern Hemisphere: Secondary Supply Chain

The United States has pursued a series of critical minerals agreements and cooperation frameworks with key allies and partners, including Australia, Cambodia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Ukraine to strengthen supply chain security and reduce reliance on adversarial nations.

Australia is one of the most important players in the global minerals market and the United States most strategic partner in this area. It possesses 40 of the 50 critical minerals on the US list and ranks as the world’s fourth-largest producer of rare earth elements. Australia is also a leading global producer of bauxite, lithium, lead, uranium, and zinc, and it has substantial mineral sand deposits of ilmenite, zircon, and rutile. In addition, the country produces large quantities of manganese, antimony, nickel, cobalt, copper, and tin.

The US–Australia framework prioritizes strategic supply security by accelerating key mining and processing projects and mobilizing investment. It enhances market stability and national security through pricing safeguards, trade protections, and stricter oversight of critical asset sales. The pact also promotes innovation and resilience through recycling initiatives, shared geological data, and a joint response group designed to quickly address supply disruptions. Two priority projects under this framework are the Alcoa–Sojitz Gallium Recovery Project and the Arafura Nolans Project.

The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue brings together the United States and five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—home to some of the world’s most strategic mineral and energy reserves. Kazakhstan holds the world’s largest uranium reserves and is the second-largest chromium producer, with 230 million metric tons—nearly 40% of global chromium. It also ranks among the top five for zinc and has major copper, cadmium, and bauxite deposits. Uzbekistan ranks 11th globally in copper reserves and hosts significant molybdenum, selenium, cadmium, and lithium resources. Tajikistan is a second largest uranium producer. It also possesses large deposits of aluminum, silver, copper, zinc, and lead. The region’s main obstacle is market access. While routes to China and Russia are established, the emerging Middle Corridor will link the region directly to the EU.

The Ukraine agreement centers on the exploration, extraction, refining, and logistics of natural resources. This focus is driven by the Ukrainian Shield, a major geological formation that makes the country rich in minerals. Ukraine holds large deposits of titanium, zirconium, graphite, uranium, manganese, copper, nickel, and zinc. It also has sizable rare earth element reserves, the largest of which are in the Donetsk region, now under Russian control following the war. Ukraine also has three known lithium deposits, two of which are located in Kirovograd and the Shevchenkivske deposit in the Donetsk region.

The Saudi deal locks in joint supply-chain security for uranium and rare earths, anchored on Saudi deposits such as Jabal Sayid, Jabal Tawlah, Ghurrayyah, Jabal Al-Hamra, and Umm Al-Birak, including heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium and light rare earths such as neodymium and praseodymium—while also expanding cooperation on clean energy, grid modernization, and civil nuclear power.

Policing the World with Middle Powers

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outsources international policing. Washington has partitioned the Eastern Hemisphere into four self-regulating theaters, providing the structural scaffolding for middle powers to maintain regional stability with American backing. In the Indo-Pacific, India and key littorals act as the primary active deterrence against Chinese hegemony; in Europe, NATO manages the Russian front. In the Middle East, Washington is engineering a “balance of balances” to prevent regional dominance by any single actor. While the US considers the Israeli-Emirati axis, a high-tech deterrence, it sees Pakistan as the leader of Islamic Defense Alliance and counterweight. By encouraging Islamabad to become the net security provider and stabilizer for the Middle East and North Africa, the NDS hedges security through the friction of competing, locally managed power blocs. While this strategy may work to a certain extent, it leaves an already volatile region exposed to great power competition. In the aftermath of the conflict with Yemen and Iran, the Middle East has undergone a fundamental shift; the weaponization of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has turned these chokepoints into theaters for geopolitical competition. Consequently, global supply chains now sit in a precarious position, effectively held hostage by the threat of a single incident. The only way long term peace and stability can be ensured is if United States and Iran are able to strike a deal.

Disruption for Leverage and Profiteering

The escalating conflict involving the US, Israel, and Iran has led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, severing global energy supplies. As the world’s largest importer of Middle Eastern oil and LNG, China finds itself at the center of this crisis. Beijing’s predicament is exacerbated by the collapse of the Maduro regime; as American influence reclaimed Venezuela, China’s secondary supply lines were systematically disrupted. Simultaneously, Washington has permitted India to import Russian oil, further tightening the global market against Beijing. This triple shock leaves the Chinese economy uniquely vulnerable, facing a definitive countdown as its 109-day strategic reserve begins to deplete. This orchestrated energy vacuum provides Washington with leverage ahead of the Trump-Xi summit in May. The Trump administration intends to weaponize this vulnerability to force a reset of the bilateral relationship, demanding a more favorable trade deal and Beijing’s full compliance with Section 232 protocols.

By exporting its domestic surplus at crisis-driven premium prices, the US is converting regional chaos into a massive economic opportunity. Ultimately, Washington is leveraging the disruption of Middle Eastern refining and transit to extract maximum profit. But not all is well on the domestic front for Trump. Heading into the 2026 midterm elections, the Trump administration faces a precarious political landscape as the domestic benefits of high oil prices fail to reach voters. While US energy companies are reaping massive profits following the military conflict, American consumers are struggling with rising fuel prices. This economic strain has pushed Trump’s approval ratings to record lows, threatening the Republican party’s narrow majorities in Congress. To mitigate this Trump has pivoted toward a ceasefire and negotiations—seeking a diplomatic “off-ramp” that would stabilize global energy markets and provide a much-needed popularity boost before November.

Sovereignty vs Standards

The January 14 Proclamation was a structural rupture, not just a policy shift. By invoking Section 232 to manage mineral flows, Washington has effectively sidelined the WTO, signaling that the era of global trade standards is being superseded by a new regime of resource realism. ​European disbelief over Greenland has hardened into militant defiance. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen branded US tariff threats a mistake, declaring Greenland’s sovereignty non-negotiable. Brussels has since frozen the US-EU trade deal and readied its Anti-Coercion Instrument—Europe’s “trade bazooka”—to counter predatory overreach.

​Canada’s Mark Carney drove the point home: “Nostalgia is not a strategy.” His critique cut to the bone: “You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit when integration becomes the source of your subordination.” For middle powers, the choice is now binary: “If we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu. For the Global South, the system was always an instrumentalized fiction—a restraint for the South and a prerogative for the North. The only shift is that Trump now views the Global North and South through the same transactional lens, applying the realpolitik once reserved for the third world. He hasn’t ruptured the order; he has stripped away the diplomatic pretense of a system always governed by power, not principles.

From Police Power to Supply Power

​The emergence of the Supply Chain Doctrine signifies more than a mere adjustment in trade policy; it marks the definitive end of the globalization era defined by market efficiency and the beginning of an era defined by strategic fortification. By invoking Section 232, Washington has signaled that it will no longer outsource its security to the lowest bidder. By bypassing the WTO and forcing a choice on allies from Brussels to Brasilia, the United States aims to win the supply chain war. Section 232 has already started to prove as an effective diplomatic lever, as evidenced by the imminent critical minerals deal between the United States and the EU. As both powers race to align ahead of the 180 days deadline.

Conclusion

​The era of American primacy is being traded for an era of American protection. Washington is betting that by controlling the bottlenecks of the modern world—the refineries, the porphyries, and the semiconductor chips—it can dictate the terms of the next century. The Trump’s doctrine in the short term, leverages global energy disruptions to force Beijing into concessions. This tactical pressure buys the necessary time for the long-term objective—the construction of entirely new and reliable supply chains in the Western and Eastern Hemisphere. By weaponizing energy flows and chokepoints today, Trump aims to bridge the transition towards a future of total industrial autonomy from China.

The age of strategic patience has ended. In its place, the United States has pivoted toward a doctrine of geopolitical terraforming—a raw exercise of power designed to fortify the Western Hemisphere into a stronghold. By aggressively building partnerships and carving out new regional blocs across the East, Trump has signaled that American hegemony will no longer be maintained through quiet diplomacy, but through the deliberate, structural re-engineering of the world on American terms. The gloves are off, and the battle to dominate the future is underway.

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As the world shifts to a low-carbon economy, critical minerals have become central to industrial and geopolitical strategy. Chromium, essential for stainless steel, aerospace components, and electric vehicles, is dominated by a handful of producers—South Africa alone supplies over 70% of global demand. This concentration makes global supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical shocks, trade disruptions, and resource nationalism. Pakistan, with significant chromite deposits in Muslim Bagh, Malakand, Waziristan, Kohistan, Khuzdar, Kharan, and Chilas, has a chance to become a strategic supplier—but seizing it requires careful management of security, governance, and regional dynamics.

Chromium: Beyond a Commodity

Chromium is more than a raw material; it underpins industrial sovereignty. Jet engines, defense systems, stainless steel, and low-carbon technologies all depend on reliable access to high-grade chromite. Countries and corporations increasingly view dependency on a few producers as a strategic vulnerability. As energy transitions accelerate, diversifying critical mineral supply chains offers both economic and geopolitical advantages.

Muslim Bagh, locally known as Chromepur, and its surrounding areas in Pakistan contain at least 70 chromite reserves, often found with alumina, magnesite, copper, nickel, zinc, gold and silver. Chromite is also recognized for concentrating platinum group elements (PGEs), further enhancing its strategic value. The strategic potential of Muslim Bagh was recognized over a century ago by the British, who developed infrastructure to support chromite exports. Today, however, the region is limited to small-scale production, and the lack of modern extraction techniques, processing facilities, and formal market structures prevents Pakistan from fully participating in global supply chains.

Building a Green Supply Chain

Rather than perpetuating underdevelopment, Muslim Bagh could become a model for a green industrial economy. Electrifying mining operations and integrating renewable energy would lower carbon emissions, reduce costs, and increase efficiency. The region is ideal for hybrid solar-wind generation and is located between the Muslim Bagh-Darzanda wind corridor: a World Bank study proposes a 65 MW wind and 120 MW solar plant, with the recently installed 132 kV transmission line ready to evacuate power.

A special economic zone for chromite processing, metallurgy, and downstream chemicals could turn Muslim Bagh into a hub for domestic and regional supply chains. Its location on a dual-carriageway highway connected to the Pakistan Economic Gateway further enables export-oriented growth, linking Pakistan’s mineral wealth to global markets.

Infrastructure and Security Challenges

Small-scale mining and washing plants exist to reduce silica content, but current methods limit profitability and global competitiveness. Valuable minerals remain unrecovered, and products sell far below international prices. The absence of formal commodity markets and supporting infrastructure compounds the problem.

Security concerns add another layer of complexity. Muslim Bagh sits in Balochistan’s Pashtun belt, where terrorist activity and insurgency overspill create risks for investors. Addressing security, governance, and social issues is critical to transforming Pakistan’s chromite reserves into a globally competitive resource.

Geopolitics of a Critical Mineral

Chromium’s strategic importance grows as countries modernize industries and accelerate decarbonization. South Africa currently dominates production, while China, the EU, and the US rely heavily on imports for stainless steel, aerospace, and batteries. Any disruption—from political instability to trade tensions—can ripple across markets, driving prices up and threatening industrial planning. Pakistan can differentiate itself as a stable, environmentally responsible supplier, helping diversify global markets and reduce dependency on a few producers. This is not just a local opportunity; it’s a chance for Pakistan to shape global industrial resilience and strategic mineral governance.

Creating a New Global Supply Chain

Unlocking Pakistan’s chromite potential is not just a national priority—it is a global opportunity. As nations and companies seek diversified and sustainable sources of critical minerals, Pakistan can provide an alternative to concentrated supply chains, supporting the resilience of industries worldwide. Strategic investment and responsible development could make Muslim Bagh and surrounding regions a blueprint for how resource-rich countries contribute to the low-carbon economy while securing long-term economic and geopolitical gains.

In the mountains of Balochistan, an opportunity waits. Transforming Chromepur into a hub for green chromium could secure Pakistan’s industrial future while powering the global transition to a cleaner, more resilient economy.

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